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Exceptionalism as Foreign Policy: The Norm of Compliance and 
U.S. Climate Change Policy  
Elizabeth L. Chalecki, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy 
 
 
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas:  the duty to exercise one’s rights  
in ways that do not harm the interests of other subjects of law 
 
“The legislature's job is to write law. It's the executive branch's job to interpret law."  
- George W. Bush, Austin, TX, 11/22/00 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Climate change is not only an environmental problem but a foreign policy problem, for the 
United States and indeed any country.  Our best scientific knowledge about the effects of global 
warming predicts negative changes, from precipitation to agriculture to disease vectors.  As such, 
it is axiomatic that nations would want to mitigate this phenomenon as early as possible.  
However, our current system of international law places no involuntary obligations, such as 
compliance with a climate mitigation treaty, on any state.  In the past, if a state refused to 
become party to a treaty, this refusal was assumed to be without prejudice.  Not anymore.  
Because the effects of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted anywhere are felt everywhere, efforts to 
mitigate climate change must be coordinated across all nations, lest any one nation have the 
incentive to free ride on the efforts of others.  Unfortunately, that is exactly what the United 
States has done over the past decade with its repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
A new norm of compliance with agreements is becoming customary with regard to the global 
environmental commons, particularly in the case of climate change, and this norm is being 
driven by improving climate science.  This chapter will examine the development of this norm of 
compliance, why the United States has failed to comply with it, and what are the consequences 
and implications of this norm for both international law and American foreign policy.  However, 
two key assumptions must be stated at the outset.  First, the intellectual concepts behind the 
creation of customary norms of international law are valid regardless of the application of those 
norms.  In other words, states are expected to comply with existing laws and norms, even if there 
is currently no real-world forum for their adjudication.  Second, for the practical purpose of this 
discussion, there is little if any operational difference between a nation that is not a party to a 
global environmental treaty and a party that is out of compliance with that same treaty.1 In both 
cases, the desired end-state is that all nations are parties and that they comply with the treaty’s 
terms. 
 
 
1 Legally, there is a world of difference between the two.  A nation out of compliance with a treaty to which it is a 
party is in breach, whereas a nation that has accepted no legal constraint in this matter can be said to be doing 
nothing wrong.  However, scientifically, an out-of-compliance party and a non-party nation are equally responsible 
for furthering global warming by failing to reduce their GHG emissions.  Hence, they are equally culpable for 
creating the international situation that gives rise to the emerging norm, and thus are equally problematic from the 
scientist’s point of view. 
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I.  Emergence of the Norm of Compliance 
Customary international law is perhaps the most vague of legal doctrines.  A norm, custom or 
general principle that appears germane to the fundamental interests of the international 
community can be thorny or tenuous when implemented.  With the international community 
itself not always able to agree upon or even identify its fundamental interests, these norms can 
seem like figures in the fog, indistinct and always moving.  It is especially difficult to determine 
when a new norm has emerged from this fog.  While the United States’ repudiation of its 
signature on the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 was legal under the practice of traditional international 
law, this same practice is no longer sufficient in scope or in time to keep pace with the rapid 
advances in our scientific understanding of global environmental processes.  Because every 
member of the international community can suffer significant harm from climate change, the 
presumption of compliance with restrictions on greenhouse gases (GHGs) is emerging as a 
customary norm of international law. 
 
A. Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
The United States, in its attempts to bring global environmental problems into its foreign 
policy orbit, has relied in the past on the negotiation and ratification of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs).  These MEAs are designed to address transnational 
environmental problems such as long-range pollution, depletion of fisheries, and stratospheric 
ozone depletion.  (For further information on specific environmental issues and relevant treaties, 
see www.ecolex.org.)  In 1992, the United States ratified the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which promoted “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.”  Five years later, the United States negotiated specific mandatory reductions in 
GHG emissions in the first Protocol to the UNFCCC, called Kyoto after the city in which it was 
signed.  Carrying further the idea of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” the developed 
countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC (the “Annex I countries”) were assigned targets 
based on the assumption that since the developed countries contributed the most to the climate 
problem with their historically high emissions levels, they would be the first ones to undertake 
emissions reductions.  The developing countries, in light of their economic conditions and 
priorities, were not assigned specific targets and timetables in this Protocol.  The United States 
signed Kyoto in 1997, but then-President Bill Clinton did not submit it to the Senate for 
ratification.  In 2001, President George W. Bush repudiated the agreement, saying that Kyoto 
was “dead” and that the U.S. now had no intention of attempting to meet its assigned targets. 
 
B. Formation of custom 
Customary international law is in operation when states both observe or practice a particular 
norm of behavior and subjectively believe that they have a legal obligation to do so.  Custom is 
important in the evolution of international law because while treaties bind only the signatory 
states, customary norms bind all states (Charney 1993, 531).  Although there is no precise 
definition of what constitutes state practice, the International Court of Justice has held that such a 
practice must be widespread and virtually uniform.  It is not required that the practice be either 
traditional or completely consistent, but it is required that states who fail to practice the custom 
be regarded as guilty of violating a legal obligation of some sort (Hunter et al 2002, 311).  What 
constitutes a legal obligation is a trickier matter to identify because it is extremely subjective: a 
state knows that the international community expects this behavior and the state itself recognizes 
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that this is something it ought to do; maybe it does not always comply, but it knows it should.  A 
legal obligation can be identified by a wide range of evidence, including diplomatic 
correspondence, official policy statements, judicial decisions, UN resolutions and declarations, 
and so forth (ibid, 312).  Such soft law can serve a number of useful purposes.  It can change the 
political thinking on an issue, it can expand the circumstances in which an issue is considered, 
and it can cause public opinion to coalesce (Palmer 1992, 269).  Palmer goes further to assign 
soft law and norm creation to the intersection of international law and international politics; in 
the climate change regime, this means the intersection of the Kyoto Protocol and anti-regime 
politicking by the United States.   
Most custom is created over time, but as global climate change progresses, we may not have 
decades or centuries to wait for a new custom of environmental compliance to emerge.  
Fortunately, a long wait is not legally required.  As precedent, the North Sea Continental Shelf 
case states that, “the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to 
the formation of a new rule of customary international law” (North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 
at §74).  This has been referred to as “instant custom,” a phenomenon which legal scholar 
Prosper Weil argues is not just acceleration of the custom-formation process, but is a revolution 
in the theory of custom because rules that have been accepted by a very large number of states 
are now instantly extended to all states, whether or not they agree (Weil 1983).  Geoffrey 
Palmer, however, argues that this is exactly the evolution in the formation of custom that the 
international environmental arena needs (Palmer 1992, 277-278).  The 1989 Hague Declaration 
on the Environment, promotes “the principle of developing … new institutional authority … 
which, in the context of the preservation of the earth’s atmosphere, shall be responsible for 
combating any further global warming … and shall involve such decision-making procedures as 
may be effective even if, on occasion, unanimous agreement has not been achieved.”  The import 
of this declaration is that decisions made by some states could now instantly be binding on all 
states.  While this development may alarm traditional practitioners of international law, this is 
exactly where environmental law based upon ecological science takes us.  Rules governing the 
global environmental commons, if rooted in rational science, become binding on all states 
because all states are de facto parties to the environment, whether or not they are de jure parties 
to a particular agreement. 
Furthermore, our scientific knowledge about climate change and its causes and effects has 
increased considerably over a relatively short period of time.  Before the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), most scientific pronouncements on climate had come from the 
Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases, a small scientific body founded in 1985 under the 
auspices of WHO and UNEP.  The larger IPCC was created in 1988 and the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program in 1990, and these international collaborations of scientists have made huge 
scientific strides in our ability to understand the causes and effects of climate change.  Only four 
years elapsed between the formation of the IPCC and the signing of the Framework Convention, 
and only another five until binding emissions reductions were negotiated.  As environmental 
science moves quickly, environmental law, especially soft law in the form of custom, must keep 
up or be rendered irrelevant. 
If a new norm of expected compliance with climate treaties is forming, what specific points 
of evidence argue for it?  First, the importance of the existing MEAs addressing compliance with 
global environmental problems cannot be overstated.  Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
deal directly with the expected reduction of GHGs, and the Stockholm Declaration, the Montreal 
Protocol (along with its framework convention), the Rio Declaration, the Law of the Sea, and 
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other MEAs deal with the expectation of environmental protection as a duty of states.  Second, 
pressure from allies and public opinion bear on the formation of custom.  The United States has 
faced pressure from close and longtime allies such as Canada and the United Kingdom as well as 
developing nations to either ratify Kyoto or take some other meaningful actions to reduce GHG 
emissions.  The American delegate at the 2007 Bali Convention was actually booed by other 
delegates when the United States refused to provide clean development assistance to developing 
nations (Eilperin 2007).  Third, sub-national actors recognize the necessity to control GHGs and 
have taken actions themselves, as discussed below.  Fourth, the best climate science we have 
argues for the need to reduce GHG emissions so as to avert possibly significant damage to the 
global environmental commons.  Taken alone, each of these points may not be dispositive, but 
taken together they argue persuasively for the recognition of a customary norm, with which the 
United States is out of compliance (Weil 1983, 422; see also Brownlie 1973, 183).   
 
C.  Actions by local/regional actors within the United States 
If climate change is a foreign policy issue by nature, is it the sole preserve of the federal 
government?  Interestingly, rather than waiting for the federal government to act, state 
governments, local governments, private companies, and universities have all taken steps to curb 
GHG emissions to the best of their ability.  In 2002, California passed a first-in-the-nation law 
requiring strict emission controls on every car sold in the state, starting in model year 2009.  
Environmental groups hope and automakers fear that, due to the size of the car market in 
California, this law could force changes in vehicles sold nationwide.  (Blocked by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, the issue is currently under litigation).  California governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger has since pledged to reduce the state’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020.  In 2007, ten northeastern and mid-Atlantic states have joined a landmark pact called the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative to reduce GHG emissions from their power plants (for more 
information on RGGI, see http://www.rggi.org).  The mayors of Seattle, New York, Chicago, 
and over 750 other cities have signed onto the Climate Protection Agreement, pledging to reduce 
their cities’ GHG emissions, to 7% below 1990 levels by 2012, exactly the target the United 
States was to have achieved under Kyoto (for more information on the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, see 
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm).  These actions help to bolster the 
acceptance of the norm at the sub-national level – the more entities (sub-national, national and 
supra-national) that accept this norm, the more it emerges from the fog of nascent custom and 
begins to impact the behavior of states.  That these sub-national actors feel they have a 
responsibility to adhere to the norm of compliance with international environmental agreements 
indicates how widespread and powerful it is, and just how exceptional the U.S. position is.2   
 
II.  How U.S. Foreign Policy has Failed to Adhere to the Norm of Compliance 
There are three distinct types of American legal exceptionalism: exemptionalism, wherein the 
United States supports multilateral treaties and regimes but only if they contain exemptions for 
U.S. practices or citizens; double standards, wherein the United States criticizes other nations but 
ignores any criticism it receives; and legal isolationism, wherein the United States ignores the 
 
2 For an examination of the benefits to the climate regime of sub-national actions and why it does not have to be 
economically irrational as “tragedy of the commons” theory suggests it would be, see Kirsten H. Engel and Scott R. 
Saleska.  Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change  32 ECOLOGY L. Q. 183 
(2005). 
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findings of other legal jurisdictions (Ignatieff 2005).  While all three types of exceptionalism 
carry significant consequences in the realm of international environmental law, American 
exemptionalism is what weighs most heavily on the climate change regime, particularly with 
regard to U.S. behavior toward the Kyoto Protocol.  Legal scholars have postulated that there are 
three reasons why states do not comply with treaty requirements:  1) ambiguity of the treaty 
language, 2) limitations on the capacity of the party to comply, and 3) temporal dimension of the 
social, economic, and political changes the treaty would require (Chayes and Chayes 1993).  
Customary norms of international law govern international behavior in the same fashion that 
treaties do by regulating the conduct of states towards each other, and in fact govern a greater 
percentage of international decisions because they operate when there is no specific treaty to 
regulate that conduct.  Consequently, the reasons that a nation might be reluctant to participate in 
a treaty stem from the same concerns that would prevent them from acknowledging a norm – that 
their obligations are unclear or too onerous, or somehow they are being treated unfairly. 
Why has the United States decided to be exceptional in the international climate regime, 
especially in the face of demonstrable environmental and legal harm?  All states benefit from the 
international law system because it imparts a degree of predictability and order to international 
relations.  The rules of the system allow members to avoid conflict and promote peaceful 
cooperative relations.  Fear of sanctions, the desire to be viewed as reliable and law-abiding, and 
general respect for the rule of law further impel states to obey customary international law.  Yet 
these rules are undermined by free-riders, states that reap the benefits of the system without 
paying the costs.  In the case of global climate change, the United States, wary of carrying free 
riders like India and China, has decided to become a free rider itself.  Its example may encourage 
other nations not to follow customary international law, thereby derailing the entire regime 
(Charney 1993, 530-533). 
 
A. “Developing countries are not participants” 
The Bush Administration has argued that the United States will not participate in the Kyoto 
Protocol or any international climate agreement that does not include developing nations such as 
India and China (White House Analysis 2001, 1).  These nations, while historical under-emitters, 
are developing rapidly and are relying heavily on fossil fuels.  China alone is looking to build 
562 new coal-fired power plants in the next eight years (Clayton 2004), and the country’s overall 
CO2 emissions are expected to surpass those from the United States as early as 2009 (IEA 2006); 
findings from one agency say that China has already overtaken the United States in total 
emissions, producing an estimated 6.2 billion metric tons CO2 to the United States’ 5.8 billion 
tons CO2 (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2006).  Compliance with the Protocol 
would place the United States at a relative disadvantage economically, both vis-à-vis the EU, 
which has a denser population and different transportation patterns and can economically absorb 
emissions cuts more easily, and the developing countries, which could undercut U.S. goods on 
the world market since they would not be forced to spend money on climate control measures 
(Cooney 1997). 
Critics of Kyoto have based this objection on the traditional American idea of fairness: if the 
United States is required to cut back on its use of fossil fuels and suffer the attendant economic 
dislocation, then other countries that also rely on fossil fuels should share the pain, regardless of 
their Annex I status. However, the legal concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
answers the purported fairness issue.  Both the UNFCCC and the Rio Declaration, as well as the 
Protocol itself, refer to the responsibility of developed nations to take the lead in combating 
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climate change not merely because they are the wealthiest countries and have the economic 
means to do so, but because the development process that generated their wealth also generated 
the GHG buildup that the entire world is now having to combat.  Though both India and China 
have implemented various domestic GHG emission limitation strategies, they have stated that 
they will not accept binding emissions limits or timetables until the developing nations do 
(Walker 2007). 
 
B.  “Economic harm” 
The Administration has argued secondly that the United States will not participate in Kyoto 
because to do so would cause significant harm to the American economy (White House Analysis 
2001, 2).  Estimates of the cost of implementing the Kyoto Protocol range from as low as one-
tenth of one percent to as high as three percent of GDP, depending on differences in the 
methodology used (EIA 2002).  However, the cost of implementing the Protocol does not have 
any bearing on the legality of the norm.  Indeed, when compared to countries who violate clear 
international legal norms against genocide and torture for political, ideological or theological 
reasons, cost seems almost a mundane reason to violate a norm, especially when coming from 
the wealthiest country on earth. Rather, the “economic harm” argument, unlike the “developing 
countries do not participate” argument, has less to do with actual economic harm and more to do 
with the political harm the Republican Party may face if the United States either ratifies Kyoto or 
implements any sort of compulsory GHG emission reduction measures.  Environmental issues in 
general have acquired a liberal Democratic cast in the United States, and are unlikely to garner 
support from a Republican Administration.  Furthermore, some political conservatives see 
compliance with any sort of global norm or treaty as a violation of American sovereignty 
(Schlafly 2000).  
 
C.  “Uncertain science” 
The Administration has argued thirdly that the science that underlies the reductions contained 
in the Protocol, and indeed the whole climate change mitigation regime, is speculative and 
arbitrary (White House Analysis 2001, 1).  Of all the arguments leveled against the Protocol, 
however, this is the only one that direct scientific evidence can overcome.  The IPCC was 
formed in 1988 by the WHO and UNEP,  
to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, 
technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific 
basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options 
for adaptation and mitigation.  IPCC reports should be neutral with respect to 
policy, although they may need to deal objectively with scientific, technical and 
socio-economic factors relevant to the application of particular policies. . . . 
Review is an essential part of the IPCC process. Since the IPCC is an 
intergovernmental body, review of IPCC documents should involve both peer 
review by experts and review by governments. (IPCC 1998) 
The IPCC is made up of thousands of scientists from around the world and is broken out into 
three working groups dealing with physical science, impacts, and mitigation and adaptation.  Its 
job is to synthesize the best scientific, technical, and socio-economic information on the causes 
and effects of climate change.  These scientists rotate in and out of chair and lead author 
positions, and all of the organization’s review procedures and finances are open for public 
scrutiny.  The IPCC represents the best international scientific accord on the problem of global 
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climate change, and its latest assessment report states clearly that, “[T]he understanding of 
anthropogenic warming and cooling influences on climate has improved since the Third 
Assessment Report (TAR), leaving to very high confidence that the globally averaged net effect 
of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.”(IPCC 2007a, 5, emphasis in original) 
Science is a new factor in the creation of customary norms of international law, though there 
is no better field in which to give scientific findings significant norm-creating weight than 
environmental law.  Science, too, can help set the bar to treaty exceptionalism much higher.  For 
example, if the United States could sequester its carbon with any measure of reliable success, it 
might have an argument for why it could be exceptional with regard to the Kyoto Protocol, 
because it would not be causing the same level of atmospheric harm per molecule of CO2 
produced as other nations who do not sequester their CO2.  However, since it cannot sequester 
CO2 economically, or at least no better than any other CO2-producing nation, it has no grounds 
for exceptionalism.  This moves environmental law away from the traditional practice that a state 
can be exceptional just because it desires to be.  In the case of the global environmental 
commons, and facing an emerging norm of expected compliance with global environmental 
treaties, mere desire to be exceptional for whatever policy reason is not enough in the face of the 
ecological damage that could be done by an “exceptional” nation. 
 
III. Implications of Norm Development 
A.  Increased application of science to international law and policy 
Arguments to persuade the United States to comply with the norm are overwhelmingly 
scientific.  Allied governments and domestic environmental groups cite the increasing GHG 
emissions and IPCC predictions of their effects, and exhort the United States to either ratify 
Kyoto or take some other significant steps to control emissions.   
The scientific component drives the qualitative argument that the global environmental 
regime is different from trade or human rights because the behavior of one nation can affect the 
viability of the entire regime for every other participant.  In the area of international trade law, 
non-parties or parties out of compliance with a particular treaty may face economic deprivation 
or, at worst, sanctions.  In areas of human rights law, non-parties or parties out of compliance 
may face sanctions, diffuse reciprocity (shunning or shaming, for example), and bad publicity.  
However, the area of global environmental law is critically different from trade and human rights 
law, because the regime attempts to address behavior not between human beings themselves, but 
between human beings and the natural world.  This relationship is one that we do not fully 
understand and certainly cannot control, though we can affect it.  Our assessment of what this 
regime should look like and what sorts of behavior it should include are governed by the best 
scientific judgment we can apply at the time, so the very purpose of the regime itself can change 
over time as our scientific knowledge advances.  Ian Brownlie argues that while existing 
customary law for the environment tolerates a certain level of “ordinary use” pollution, the 
relevant standards may be changed by new expertise, by particular complaints of states and 
competent international organizations, and by standards set in multilateral conventions 
(Brownlie 1973).  Extending this logic, the standards set in the Kyoto Protocol can be seen to 
capture the emerging norm until such time as they are superseded by better information about the 
effects of GHGs on the climate.   
A nation’s non-compliance or non-party status is much more significant in this area than in 
other areas of international law because the level of harm resulting from non-compliance or non-
participation has the potential to be much greater.  Specifically, large polluters can negatively 
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affect the viability of the treaty regime, even if they are not parties, by the sheer magnitude of 
their contamination.  In 2005, the United States emitted approximately 21% of global CO2 
emissions and was the largest emitter on a per-capita basis (IEA 2007).  Even if every other 
nation on earth were a compliant party to a climate regime, global warming would still proceed 
because of the non-compliance of the “indispensable party.”  This means that one non-party 
nation can render the entire regime ineffective and useless because the regime would not, and 
could not, achieve its goal of stabilization of atmospheric GHG levels.  In other words, non-
compliance by the United States can nullify compliance by other Annex I nations.  
Consequently, the traditional formation of customary norms has proven inadequate to deal with 
global environmental problems.  Indeed, international law as a whole has never been confronted 
with a set of problems of the nature and quality of global environmental change (Palmer 1992, 
282). 
 
B.  Increased observance of customary international law 
Could protection of the global environment and expected compliance with international 
environmental treaties even be lifted from customary norm to jus cogens? (1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, at §64)  There are some legal scholars that point out the 
negative and confusing effects of breaking the normative regime into jus cogens norms on one 
hand and “ordinary” norms on the other (Weil 1983, 423).  However, the development of jus 
cogens norms seems to be a positive one, since only the most heinous crimes of slavery, torture, 
and genocide are currently contained in this category,3 crimes which the international community 
seems uniformly prepared to banish in theory if not always in practice.  Furthermore, the 
identification of a jus cogens norm, even if unenforceable, carries its own prohibitive weight.  
For example, a state may still choose to engage in genocide, but if it does so, it knows it is doing 
something illegal and reprehensible, even if it may never come to trial.  Slavery, torture, and 
genocide are prohibitive norms; states are forbidden from carrying them out.  Compliance with 
agreements and treaties which apply to the global environmental commons, however, would be 
the first prescriptive norm to be elevated to the level of jus cogens.  This means that states would 
be required to carry them out, and the United States would not have grounds to be exceptional.   
Jus cogens norms would operate upon the whole international community, but Weil points 
out “a tendency to vague personification of the international community” (Weil 1983, 426), 
something which he finds unsettling.  Which nations are part of this international community and 
who can speak for it?  It must be a number less than the whole, or any nation would have what 
Weil calls “an inconceivable veto” over the development of any norm, jus cogens or otherwise.  
Yet it falls within the legal rights of a nation to opt in or out of this community with regard to 
certain regimes of international law.  Nations who choose not to have capitalist economies can 
opt out of the WTO or any other body of trade law.  Nations who define their social structures in 
certain ways can opt out of human rights law; while the moral value of this is questionable, the 
legal value is not.  Yet no nation on earth can opt out of the international environment.  No 
nation can pronounce, “We choose not to be affected by climate” or “We choose not to need 
fresh water, so these rules don’t apply to us.”  This is where science, particularly global 
 
3 Some scholars have argued that rape and the juvenile death penalty ought to be jus cogens norms as well, which 
means the category is open for expansion beyond its current limits.  See Dean Adams, The Prohibition of 
Widespread Rape as a Jus Cogens, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 357 (2004); and Rachel J. Avery,  Killing Kids Who 
Kill: An International Perspective on the Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States  7 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF.  303 (2002). 
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environmental science, can play its part in both delineating the international community and 
identifying norms that are in its fundamental interests and, by extension, norms that each state 
must abide by without abrogation.  In the case of the global environment, the international 
community includes every nation on earth and abrogation of any state’s fundamental 
responsibilities negatively affects each member. 
 
Conclusion: Where Should the United States Go From Here? 
It is possible that nations who do not comply with a regime or customary norm will face 
diffuse reciprocity from their allies and other parties.  This can take the form of obstructionism in 
other legal areas, such as imposition of tariffs or travel restrictions, disagreement or non-
enforcement of legal judgments, or bad publicity (Dowd 2005).  However, only Germany seems 
to have attempted to link trade sanctions with U.S. obstruction of climate agreements and the 
norm underlying it (Dempsey 2007).  In order for diffuse reciprocity to be effective, the 
“reciprocity” part must be made clear: in this case, the United States must know that it is not 
receiving the full international cooperation it desires in a non-environmental area due to its non-
compliance in the environmental area, specifically that it has not and apparently will not ratify 
Kyoto.  In other words, the link must be explicit, or the non-compliant party will not understand 
how it needs to change its behavior to avoid further reciprocity.  Reciprocity also has the most 
value when the parties are more equal in size and power (Keohane 1986).  Thus, there is a 
limited amount of reciprocity that other parties can apply to the United States, since it is a critical 
player in world trade, finance, media, and many other global regimes. 
At this time, the substance and conduct of U.S. foreign policy is at this time very 
administration-dependent, especially in the climate arena.  The Bush Administration currently 
clings to an unpopular position on climate change, yet in the United States, the president 
conducts foreign policy.  None of the players in the international climate regime, nation or NGO, 
anticipates a change in the substance of U.S. policy until a new president is elected in 2009.  
However, all of the Democratic candidates for president and about half of the Republican 
candidates have stated that the United States should undertake mandatory GHG reductions, 
either through a cap-and-trade system, a carbon tax, or an international agreement.   
Certainly, the United States is already feeling the pressure.  Earlier in 2007, Australia elected 
a new prime minister, Kevin Rudd, whose first act as PM was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  This 
left the United States as the only remaining Annex I nation that has not done so.  The 2007 Bali 
Conference of the Parties was the latest chance for the nations around the world to make their 
displeasure with the American position on climate change clear.  Even China, India, Brazil, and 
other large, rapidly developing nations which are not required to cut GHG emissions under 
Kyoto have now begun to take the norm of compliance into account, and have agreed to take 
specific steps to do so.  After much negotiation, some of it acrimonious, the consensus document 
was finally approved, which committed the United States and other developed nations to 
“measurable, reportable, and verifiable” assistance to developing nations (Bali Action Plan 2007, 
1), though any mention of quantifiable emissions targets is still off the table until Copenhagen in 
2009.   
As climate and environmental science gets better, we are learning more and more about how 
the actions of every nation affect the global commons.  This in turn gives more weight to the 
norm of compliance with climate regimes, because while such compliance might be 
economically costly in the short term, international regimes such as the UNFCCC and Kyoto are 
currently the only weapon we have to forestall catastrophic climate alterations. 
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